In recent years, China has been strengthening its economic and political presence in Eastern Europe, as well as in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. But in Belarus, despite talk of great friendship, Beijing’s influence remains rather limited.

After the West imposed sanctions on Belarus in 2020 and 2021 following the crackdown on protests and the arrest of prominent dissidents, the Eastern European nation has become heavily dependent on Russia . Ahead of the controversial 2020 presidential election, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko sought to expand his “multi-vector” foreign policy. He not only worked to improve relations with the European Union and the United States, but also sought to attract Chinese investment. From China’s perspective, such circumstances were ideal for the implementation of its controversial Belt and Road Initiative. A new reality, however, has created a more challenging environment for China’s plans in Belarus.

Although Beijing apparently aims to increase its economic presence in Belarus, the lack of structural reforms, as well as a sort of Soviet-style economy, seem to be preventing a greater influx of Chinese investment. In other words, China, as well as some powerful Russian oligarchic structures, see Belarus’ current economic model as an obstacle to further cooperation. Yet in 2015 Minsk hoped to attract Chinese investment in a ‘smart city’ project in the Belarusian capital, but in 2021 it became apparent that UAE-based Emaar Properties, rather than Chinese companies, would build a €4 billion complex.

Despite this, China has so far financed at least 35 infrastructure projects in Belarus. The most important is the big stone of the China-Belarus Industrial Park. China Exim Bank and China Development Bank provided $3 billion in loans to develop mechanical engineering, electronics and telecommunications, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, new materials, logistics, digital trade, storage and processing of big data in the Great Stone Park. However, out of 60 investors in the park, only 33 are Chinese, while 12 are Belarusians and the rest are companies from various other countries.

In September 2021, Belarus took another $19.55 million Chinese loan for the reconstruction of the Stolbtsy-Baranovichi power transmission lines in central Belarus. But Chinese loans and economic activities in the Eastern European country remain overshadowed by Russian actions on the ground. For comparison, at the end of March 2020, the volume of loans granted to Minsk by Moscow reached almost 8 billion dollars, according to the prospectus of the issue of Belarusian Eurobonds, while the outstanding debt of Belarus to China is about $3 billion.

Until 2020, China was actively lending money to Minsk. In December 2019, Belarus got a $500 million loan from the People’s Republic and it was not tied to any particular project. The money could be spent for any purpose, including repaying and servicing state debt, maintaining Belarusian gold and currency reserves, and helping to develop trade between the Belarus and China. But in December 2020, after Russia effectively helped Lukashenko stay in power, Moscow approved a billion dollar loan for his ally. As Russian President Vladimir Putin recently pointed out, Russia’s total loan volume to Belarus from September 2021 to the end of 2022 will be around $630 million. So, from a financial point of view, it is Russia rather than China that is buying social stability in Belarus.

Relations between China and Belarus, on the other hand, are above all political, but to some extent they are also a source of balance in the face of Minsk’s growing dependence on Russia. The problem, however, is that Lukashenko’s political leeway has become very limited, meaning he is unlikely to develop deeper economic and political ties with Beijing without Moscow’s approval.

At this point, the economic interests of China and Russia in Belarus do not overlap. When it comes to energy, which is the main driver of Russian foreign policy, Chinese influence in the former Soviet republic is minimal. Russian energy giant Gazprom, on the other hand, already owns the Belarusian section of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, and Putin and Lukashenko have reportedly agreed to deepen Belarus’ energy integration with the Russian Federation.

Finally, the very fact that a new land-sea freight delivery service – from Shaanxi province in northwest China to Mannheim in Germany – is bypassing Belarus makes it clear that the former Soviet republic is not on Beijing’s list of priorities in Eastern Europe. China will, however, strive to preserve good relations with the Belarusian authorities, but in order to implement their economic programs in Belarus, the Chinese leaders will have to reach an agreement not with Lukashenko, but with the Kremlin. After all, in a new Cold War reality, all roads to Minsk pass through Moscow.

Image credit: Steve Parker